The digital age has brought new possibilities and potency to state surveillance activities. 
INTRODUCTION
The digital age has sparked a fundamental transformation in state surveillance, both in terms of how surveillance is conducted and the type of insights it is intended to facilitate. This transformation is exemplified by the use of bulk communications data techniques, 1 which involve the large-scale collection, retention, and subsequent analysis of communications data. 2 These techniques have now become an integral feature of state surveillance. For instance, UK Intelligence and Security Services report that the use of bulk communications data is 'essential', 3 and a key tool in fulfilling their obligation to protect human rights. Others, however, have highlighted the potential for serious human rights concerns, 4 particularly with respect to rights such as the right to privacy, the right to freedom of expression, the right to freedom of assembly and association, and the prohibition of discrimination. While improved intelligence capabilities can unquestionably facilitate the fulfilment of state obligations with respect to the protection of life and public order, interference with the aforementioned rights has the potential to undermine both individual rights and the effective functioning of participatory democracy. 5 This article examines bulk communications data surveillance through the lens of human rights law, drawing on social science perspectives to further analyse potential harms and impacts. In doing so, the article recognises limitations in comprehensively addressing all of the component parts of this issue. By nature, and as discussed below, exhaustive analysis of this highly dynamic area is problematic. Indeed, it is precisely these limitations that challenge the applicability of current human rights law tests. In response, this article highlights several core issues to draw out the inherent complexities, and to discuss how bulk communications data surveillance can be Human rights law typically applies a three-part test to assess the legitimacy of surveillance measures. 9 First, does a legal basis exist under domestic law, and is this legal basis of sufficient quality to protect against arbitrary interference with individuals' rights? Second, does surveillance pursue a legitimate aim? Third, is the surveillance necessary in a democratic society, i.e. does it answer a pressing social need and is it proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued? 10 Evaluating the legal basis, and the quality of this legal basis, is dependent on the specific legal framework applicable in a given jurisdiction, while intelligence and security services uses of surveillance measures typically satisfy the legitimate aim test on the basis of protecting national security or public order. 11 As such, and to examine the specific human rights issues raised by the bulk collection of communications data at a more universal level, this article will focus on the third part of the human rights law test:
evaluating the necessity in a democratic society of bulk communications surveillance.
This requires an examination of both the potential utility, 12 and the potential human rights-related harm, of this practice. To facilitate an understanding of the core issues, this paper is organised over four areas of discussion. Section 2 begins by discussing the nature of communications data, and briefly highlighting some relevant human rights law issues. Sections 3 and 4 then engage in an initial discussion of how bulk communications data techniques may be seen through existing formulations of utility and harm.
Section 3 advances the argument that effective assessment of utility is increasingly challenged in its ability to capture the complexity of contemporary digital surveillance practices. In particular, this is because access to specific information demonstrating utility is circumscribed -often legitimately -by national security concerns, while there is also a more general sense of opacity concerning the instrumentality and impact of digitally generated data. This means that an accurate utility assessment is difficult to achieve. Nonetheless, the benefits associated with bulk practices should not be summarily dismissed. Section 4 examines the other side of the equation, drawing on social science analysis of surveillance to indicate the direct and indirect harms linked to bulk monitoring. However, as with utility, this section argues that although factors indicating harm do exist, the precise identification of, for example, a chilling effect, is difficult to achieve. Ultimately, the challenges associated with examinations of utility and harm raise pressing questions regarding the appropriateness of the human rights law test, as currently applied, and highlight the need for further transparency in relation to claimed utility, and further consideration of -and research into -the broader human rights harms, including at the societal level.
In an effort to resolve this issue, Section 5 argues that any analysis regarding the 'necessity' of bulk communications data surveillance should take into account: (a) the extent of information revealed by communications data, (b) the extent to which harms associated with retained communications data affect a broad range of rights, (c) the ease at which communications data can be subject to analysis, and (d) the utility of bulk communications data to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. On the basis of these factors it is proposed first that communications data be regarded as equivalent to content data, and second that human rights law should adopt a more nuanced approach to the issue of 'mass surveillance'. In order to take advantage of the utility associated with bulk communications data surveillance techniques, while mitigating the full range of associated harms, a clearer and stricter understanding of the types of activities to which bulk techniques may be applied is required. This section provides guidance as to how the 'necessity' test can be applied in the context of bulk surveillance, addressing how current broadly conceived notions of 'serious crime' can be revised.
associated with a communication, apart from the actual substance of the communication. 13 A frequently used example suggests that communications data consists of the information on the outside of an envelope, while content data relates to the information contained within the actual letter. However, this analogy does not reflect the true nature or extent of communications data in the current era, or the fact that it can be just as invasive as content data. The widespread integration of technology into everyday life, coupled with increasing digitisation, means that individuals produce significant amounts of communications data in the course of a normal day.
14 This information can reveal extensive insights, such as a near comprehensive record of an individual's movements, who they communicate with, how frequently, and for how long. Communications data is not restricted to conventional communications -such as phone calls, emails, or messaging -but also includes communication between computers and Internet browsing histories.
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Communications data is deemed particularly useful to the intelligence and security services when combined and aggregated to produce a near-comprehensive record of an individual's communications and Internet-based activity. 16 Such data is used to find patterns in, or characteristics of, communications that may indicate involvement in a threat to national security or the commission of a crime, 17 or to construct a more generalised 'intelligence picture' of a particular subject. In particular, communications data can be used to uncover the composition of a network, potential hierarchies within 13 The UK High Court classified communications data into three broad categories: subscriber data, service data, and traffic data. Following a failed terrorist attack in London in 2007, the security and intelligence agencies were able to confirm that the perpetrators were the same as a group who had carried out another attack shortly afterwards.
This was achieved in a matter of hours through the analysis of bulk communications data, and was vital in understanding the scale of the threat posed in a fast-moving post-incident investigation, because of the ability to identify connections at speed; it would not have been possible to do this at speed by relying on requests for targeted communications data. Despite these broad claims of utility it is difficult to examine the specific role and degree of influence played by bulk communications data surveillance, given the limited publicly available information. From a human rights law perspective, the issue is not whether bulk communications data surveillance is useful, but rather whether it is 'strictly necessary in a democratic society', including whether it is 'strictly necessary In particular, the embeddedness of these practices within intelligence work renders it difficult to conduct a post-operation review to identify which specific components of the operation contributed to a successful outcome. An operation will necessarily draw on myriad available techniques, and it is exceptionally difficult to know which will be effective in advance. In this context, serious consideration must be given to the intelligence and security services' experience, and their claims that bulk communications data techniques are 'essential'. empirical evidence is drawn upon to stake a number of core areas in which potential harms of surveillance have been identified. Principal among these are: chilling effects and shifting modes of suspicion with the latter subdivided into issues of labelling and mental health. In doing so, a series of arguments are developed which gravitate towards two prominent polarities used to assess the permissibility and impact of surveillance practices.
Similar to the debates regarding the utility of surveillance, surveillance harms are highly complex and contested issues. Analysis of these debates further challenges the adequacy of utility-harm oppositions to understand the benefits and impacts of surveillance practices in the digital age.
Chilling Effects
In the context of surveillance, a chilling effect is said to arise when individuals refrain from engaging in certain forms of activity because of the perceived consequences if that activity is observed.
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As such, any chilling effect immediately brings into play rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of assembly, as it will impact upon individuals' ability to freely access information, to develop their understanding of specific issues, to engage in communication -or meet -with particular individuals or organisations, and so on. When these rights considerations are addressed at a societal level, it is apparent that a chilling effect can impact upon the effective functioning of a participatory democracy. In short, democracy is dependent upon an informed citizenry, capable of engaging with a diverse range of ideas, and of challenging the status quo. This is the essence of the 'free marketplace of ideas'.
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It is the possibility that individuals refrain from engaging in activity perceived to be contentious that risks undermining democracy. Third, surveillance practices operate in a complex social and cultural milieu which make it difficult to isolate surveillance as the sole driver for mediating specific intentions and behaviours. Such circumstances make it challenging to identify the precise driver of any chilling effect, whether it be, for example, fear of hostile reception from a disagreeing audience, fear of a punitive sanction from more remote and invisible state agencies, or something else. Relatedly, chilling effects may be mediated by a range of subjective, social, psychological and ideological beliefs -such as belief in the legitimacy of state surveillance, levels of fear, perceived likelihood of terrorist attack, demographic location, and so on -which makes additionally complex more generalised conclusions that a censored opinion is solely related to state surveillance.
While encountering similar limitations of sample size and potential for generalization one recent study does provide a more nuanced and detailed analyses of this latter issue of socio-cultural location. 78 While small -225 self-selecting participants (and therefore not controlled for non-response bias) -key findings reveal the highly focused impacts of chilling effects and their mediation via a range of subjective and social perceptions.
Amongst the results are suggestions that it is an individual's perceived dissonance with majority opinion, rather than exposure to information about online surveillance, that most heavily influences the likelihood of someone expressing an opinion online.
It is possible to thus extend this analysis to identify two major yet related implications for the consideration of surveillance chill. First, as numerous other empirical studies have pointed out, chilling effects are not generalizable, precisely because they are not felt evenly across social groups. 79 Second, and as a corollary, it is important to recognise that it is the groups holding the fewest resources and social capital required to challenge authority that are most heavily impacted by chilling effects. This has particular relevance for any human rights law analysis as it directly relates to the ability to challenge the status quo and thus to the effective functioning of participatory democracy. It directly brings into play rights such as the right to freedom of expression, and the right to freedom of assembly.
Overall, such insights provide a corrective to crude statements that a linear path exists between state surveillance and a generalized chilling of expression. Available evidence challenges the notion that chilling effects hold a uniform and very general coarsegrained impact across the societal range. Instead, a range of variables assert themselves onto the process, attenuating their intensity, form, and prevalence.
Concerns over the ambiguity and reach of chilling effects have found expression in the courts and served to weight arguments against acknowledging surveillance harms. to collect intelligence on individuals reasonably believed to be outside of the US. Several US-located civil society groups argued that because they may be in contact with individuals subject to these surveillance measures, they might themselves become objects of scrutiny with their communications and other interactions monitored. Among other arguments, the plaintiffs argued that such surveillance activities exerted a chilling effect on their First Amendment Rights.
Homeland Security to track and monitor social media -this study sought to examine variations in related web traffic for the months immediately preceding and following the June 2013 Snowden revelations. 81 Quantifying such activity through advanced statistical modelling techniques the authors were able to demonstrate a 'large, sudden, and statistically significant drop in the total view counts' for these articles, an 'immediate drop-off of over 30% of overall views', 82 translating into a reduction of 995,085 views and suggestive of a substantial chilling effect on online searches.
Taken together, available evidence suggests chilling effects can be neither assumed in their totality, nor summarily rejected out of hand as unproblematic. Yet empirical evidence suggests that chilling effects hold complex and variegated forms and assert diverse impacts most acutely felt outside the 'mainstream'; i.e. an underlying element in why an individual modifies (or 'chills') their behaviour is to bring their activity inline with perceived majority sentiment.. This last point is pertinent for the current discussion, given the implications with respect to individual development and democratic participation.
4.2.
Reconfigured suspicion and surveillance collateral Often expressed through a familiar trinity of justifications -that no harm is inflicted, individuals are unaware of being observed, and only the smallest fragments of metadata are recorded -digital data collection and analysis are regularly assigned benign labels. 83 Yet it is also possible to argue that the warehousing of data associated with millions of people, almost all of whom are law-abiding and engaged in normal daily life, exerts a profound impact on how suspicion is rendered and administered. Bulk monitoring elevates millions into the realm of the potentially suspicious in a narrowed Yet the scope and scale of bulk collection extends far beyond the reach of these other practices, signifying a transformation in the way suspicion is characterised.
Of key concern here is the range of activities that may be described as bulk monitoring. 
RE-EXAMINING THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW APPROACH TO BULK COMMUNICATIONS DATA SURVEILLANCE
The above discussion demonstrates the complexities involved in assessing potential utilities and harms associated with bulk communications data techniques. Given the significant human rights concerns involved -relating not only to the protection of individuals' rights, but also to the effective functioning of democracy itself -this is of serious concern. In particular, this uncertainty and ambiguity make effective assessment of the necessity of bulk communications data surveillance difficult to achieve. 96 To-date, courts and human rights bodies have primarily focused on the impact of surveillance in light of the right to privacy. However, a number of other rights may be affected, and the effect on these rights may be particularly severe in the context of bulk communications data surveillance. Relevant rights include, for example, the rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly, and respect for human dignity.
Importantly, although it has not addressed the issue in detail, the European Court of Justice has acknowledged that retention of communications data may affect individuals' willingness to engage the right to freedom of expression. 102
Notwithstanding the difficulties associated with demonstrating the chilling effect, particular attention must be paid to identifying and understanding its impacts given the potentially serious consequences for both individuals and society. a state may react to certain expression, it is more likely that this concern will arise in relation to non-mainstream opinions, such as political expression, i.e. expression that may be regarded as opposing the state, the Government, or elements of Government policy. If this political expression is restricted, then the ability to oppose Government policies will be undermined. Existing research indicated that those most vulnerable to a chilling effect are opposition movements, minority groups, and those with fewest resources to challenge the status quo.
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The effect is such that it may reproduce marginalisation and impact upon, or undermine, the basis of a pluralistic democracy; that is, the ability to debate and oppose Government policies. This risks a further, corollary, erosion of the right to freedom of expression. This line of reasoning may be straightforwardly extended to the rights to freedom of association and assembly. It is this ability to monitor and to analyse that makes communications data so useful to intelligence agencies. Indeed, the UK Intelligence and Security Committee noted given operation, is exceptionally difficult. In determining how best to move forward, two factors should be considered. First, the current distinction between content and communications data in terms of the level of rights protection should be removed.
Second, a more nuanced approach to the regulation of bulk communications data surveillance should be developed.
Removing the (now artificial) distinction between content and communications data
To-date, courts have drawn a distinction between content and communications data, 'interception of content is more intrusive than access to communications data.' 112 However, the distinction between the content of communications and communications data is no longer viable.
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As discussed above, the insights revealed by communications data, and the ease at which this data may be subject to analysis, indicate that it is wholly appropriate that communications data and the content of communications be granted an equivalent level of protection. Not only are analyses of metadata as intrusive as the examination of content, the partition between metadata and content is in itself a spurious distinction. Much of the latter can be discerned from the former and their delineation can only be achieved through highly subjective means. Simply put, there is no meaningful distinction between the sensitivity of information revealed by content or communications data. There is increasing recognition as regards the validity of this conclusion. For instance, the European although these were applied exclusively in the content of externally-focused surveillance activities. These appear to constitute an appropriate starting point, and so attention will now turn to how 'necessity' is evaluated.
Developing a more nuanced approach to bulk communications data techniques: understanding what constitutes 'serious crime'
As noted, the opacity associated with effectively measuring both the utility and harm of bulk powers renders a straightforward application of the current human rights law test problematic. To overcome these difficulties, it is suggested that a more nuanced approach is required, so that the poverty of this dichotomy, and the complexity and dynamism of the operating environment can be fully taken into account. As it currently stands, there is insufficient information in the public domain to take a position as to whether particular bulk powers satisfy the relevant human rights law test and can therefore be lawfully deployed. However, these are live issues -both in terms of legislative developments and judicial proceedings -and so it is essential that the human rights law test be clearly set out.
In developing any approach, recourse must be had to existing case law. to an individual operation. These requirements will be discussed in turn.
In relation to the first component, it is appropriate that the use of bulk powers be restricted to only the most significant threats. As discussed above, although the harm associated with bulk surveillance is difficult to quantify, it is of a nature to undermine the effective functioning of democratic society. Other activities threatening national security should also be addressed. However, caution is required in this regard, as national security is a broad concept, and one that has been abused in the past. Rather than being regarded as a catch-all category justifying bulk powers, only those specific national security threats rising to the threshold elaborated above should be considered. This will require answering difficult questions. For instance, should the threat posed by lone-wolf attackers be distinguished from the threat posed by more organised terrorist groups?
Equally, the human rights law threshold means that other crimes, although 'serious' in terms of their gravity and impact on affected individuals, will not satisfy the required threshold. For instance, murder is unquestionably a serious crime that will result in a significant custodial sentence. However, it is not of a nature to threaten the functioning of democratic society. To reiterate, this does not suggest that those crimes that fall below the initial strict necessity threshold are not grave, or do not warrant full and effective investigation; indeed, in a large number of instances international human rights law requires that effective investigations be undertaken, and requires that the state be held to account should it fail to do so. Rather, it is a clear acknowledgement that bulk powers are particularly invasive and pose harms that may undermine or impair the functioning of democratic society. Only threats to democratic society itself can justify such measures.
The second component requires that measures be 'vital' to a specific operation. In the context of bulk powers, this is a potentially difficult test to apply as a 'mosaic' of different approaches are used in the development of intelligence or investigative profiles. Care should therefore be taken to develop an appropriately nuanced approach. It may be impossible to make a bright line distinction as to whether bulk techniques are useful or vital in specific operations. However, utility exists across a spectrum, and the nature of the role bulk powers play may be evaluated in light of the existence of alternative techniques. Essentially, this requires determining whether other (non-bulk) techniques exist, and distinguishing between those situations in which bulk powers are useful and those situations where they are 'vital'; i.e. the operation cannot proceed without bulk powers. For example, traditional or targeted techniques are arguably sufficient to murder investigations, or efforts to uncover hierarchies within domestic terrorist, drug or organised crime organisations. In these cases, although bulk techniques may be useful, proven alternative techniques exist and may be deployed. Of course, important questions do arise in relation to efficiencies generated by bulk surveillance, particularly in relation to time and costs. However, the relevance of these factors must be considered in light of the invasiveness of the techniques and it does not seem appropriate that they should be decisive for those crimes falling below the 'serious crime' threshold.
Bulk techniques may play a much more significant role in other operations. For instance, bulk techniques may be essential in relation to certain cyber security threats, or threats from foreign-based terrorist organisations. This has been acknowledged by the European Court of Human Rights. In Centruum for Rattvisa v. Sweden, the European Court accepted that the operation of a bulk interception regime 'in order to identify hitherto unknown threats to national security is one which continues to fall within State's margin of appreciation ', 128 while Big Brother Watch and Others addressed externally-focused threats and accepted, in principle, the appropriateness of bulk measures in this context. 129 In such circumstances it is for the state to demonstrate the necessity of such powers, and to detail why traditional alternatives are inadequate. In doing so, state agencies could develop a methodology for ascertaining the degree of indispensability of bulk powers in any given application. The existence, operation and credibility of this methodology could be a key focal point for oversight agencies.
Given the potential harm, resource or efficiency savings cannot provide justification, in and of themselves. It should be recalled that in situations where bulk powers cannot be justified, targeted surveillance measures may be initiated. As such, the benefits of, for example, communications data analysis are not necessarily denied to security agencies. The requirement is that such surveillance be initiated on the basis of reasonable suspicion.
CONCLUSION
This paper has argued for the importance of defining the specific offences to which bulk communications data techniques may be applied. Such determinations should focus on activities that constitute a genuine threat to democratic institutions, for which extensive surveillance powers are warranted. This approach recognises the utility of bulk communications data techniques, but avoids the pitfalls associated with attempting to determine the role played by such techniques in specific operations. and security agencies, will no doubt continue, clarity in this regard will also provide guidance to the intelligence and security services, and help to protect against overreach. Importantly, this approach does not create an artificial distinction between intelligence and policing activities, but instead focuses on the actual crimes or activities being combatted. Other benefits include greater operational clarity than that existing through the current understanding of the strict necessity test, which focuses on utility in specific operations. A clear onus must be placed on the intelligence and security agencies to demonstrate the strict necessity requiring the use of such exceptional and far-reaching measures.
However, human rights concerns do not end with a clearer understanding of what 'serious crime' means in this context. Access to bulk communications data and oversight must be addressed. Both of these components are essential, not only with respect to preventing abuse, but also to ensuring public confidence. In particular, if access to bulk communications data is tightly circumscribed, and accompanied by effective oversight, then the harm associated with surveillance and the chilling effect may be reduced: active surveillance will be -and will be known to be -the exception and not the rule. Human rights case law establishes a number of relevant requirements in relation to both access and oversight.
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These will not be discussed in detail here.
Instead a few foundational elements may be highlighted.
The authority to conduct bulk communications data surveillance must be limited to those situations where it is 'strictly necessary in a democratic society', and should therefore only be permissible in relation to serious crime, as defined in the above discussion. It is equally essential that access to the product of any bulk communications data programme be correspondingly restricted. In most -if not allsituations, the request to initiate bulk surveillance must be linked to a defined operation, and access restricted to that same operation. This will ensure that information collected is ring-fenced, and is not re-purposed. This would not only mitigate a range of potential surveillance harms, but may also bring ancillary benefits with regard to conformity with good practice within data protection and data management regimes. Failure to restrict access appropriately undermines or negates the requirements imposed on the initial collection, potentially resulting in an extension of exceptional powers to non-exceptional incidents.
Oversight measures provide a key means of both preventing abuse, and ensuring public confidence in the use of bulk powers. Accountability, and the role of the courts, are clearly important issues. However, it is equally essential that independent oversight bodies examine the day-to-day practice of those agencies involved in the use of bulk techniques, 131 and issue public facing reports.
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They should ensure that procedures are followed, but also should examine how information is stored, who has access to it, how data is processed, deleted, and so on. Future research into effective access and oversight regimes could build on these insights and thus add additional weight to the 'downstream' elements of bulk data handling that exist beyond the point of collection, yet exert additional potential for harm.
